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Abstract: What are the prospects that risk-sharing in the EMU will ever attain the 
levels in the U.S.? So far as the risk-sharing in the U.S. depends on in-
terregional transfers through the budget of the federal government, 
those prospects are poor. So far as the risk-sharing in the U.S. takes 
place though market channels, they are much better. The paper ad-
dresses the theory and evidence on the subject. Asdrubali, Sørensen 
and Yosha provide a general framework of analysis. One issue is the 
adequacy of the framework. With respect to the evidence, the EMU 
still lags far behind the U.S. as regards the pooling of risks through 
portfolio diversification. But there already seems to be little to distin-
guish the euro zone from the U.S. concerning the ability to borrow to 
smooth shocks. Thus, the extent of risk-sharing via credit  a matter 
that Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha raise  is of special interest. Fur-
ther, the empirical evidence indicates that the progress of European 
economic and monetary integration over the last decade has increased 
the symmetry of business cycles. However, this could be a sign of re-
maining capital-market imperfections, though that is only one interpre-
tation.   
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In rich countries, the separate regions share risks with one another to an important degree. On 
the other hand, the member countries of the EMU do not pool risks nearly as much as regions 
within countries do. The main point of comparison is always the United States.  When a re-
gion of the U. S. suffers an adverse shock, its tax contributions to the federal budget diminish 
and it receives federal help in other ways. Federal transfers and grants stay up, and some of 
them may even rise. The region thereby obtains relief. In the case of an EMU member in dif-
ficulty, no similar assistance will come from the EU budget. In this respect, the member coun-
tries of the EMU are at a distinct disadvantage relative to the regions of the U.S.  Short of an 
unforeseen reform in the EMU, this will continue.  
 
However, Americans also share risks in other ways that Europeans can hope to emulate in the 
future. There is a significant cross-ownership of claims to property in the U.S.  When an ad-
verse shock hits a U.S. region, the residents will share the damage with the non-residents to 
some extent because many holders of the income claims to the output live in different regions. 
By promoting capital market integration, EMU may encourage risk-sharing of this sort. In 
addition, the residents in a region in the throes of a recession will find it easier to borrow from 
their compatriots in other sections because of a single money. EMU should clearly encourage 
risk-sharing of that sort too. Many theorists would not refer to risk-sharing in this last in-
stance. They would reserve the term for insurance coming from portfolio diversification 
(while occasionally allowing the term to cover also aforementioned transfers through the cen-
tral-government budget). However, under autarchy, residents would not be able to smooth 
shocks via credit. Therefore, there is little harm in broadening the concept of risk-sharing to 
encompass credit transactions as well.   
 
An important contribution by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) (hereafter ASY) pro-
poses a framework that is capable of analyzing all three previous mechanisms of risk-sharing 
in an integrated way: namely, (1) transfers through the upper-government budget; (2) insur-
ance or cross-ownership of income claims to output; (3) credit or borrowing and lending. The 
authors estimate the risk-sharing via these three mechanisms to be, respectively, 13, 39, and 
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23 percent in the U.S. The last two of these numbers  those regarding the risk sharing 
through market channels  add up to 62 percent, implying considerable smoothing of output 
shocks. If these estimates can be taken seriously, the prospects for risk-sharing in the EMU 
are much better than they otherwise appear.  Thus, the logic and the accuracy of ASYs esti-
mates are important. 
 
In the first section, this paper will consider the extent of risk-sharing via the federal budget in 
the U.S. Some basic related questions still remain open on this subject. The next section will 
proceed to examine the risk-sharing in the U.S. via cross-ownership of claims to output and 
via credit. The discussion will then take up the prospects for higher risk-sharing through the 
two market mechanisms in the EMU. The final section will move on to examine the impact of 
EMU on the total insurable risks. This next matter will bring us into familiar territory, con-
cerning the degree of asymmetry of the shocks.  
 
The major conclusions  at least a few of them  may be mentioned at once. First, the broad 
differences in the literature in the estimates of risk-sharing via the federal budget in the U.S., 
going from 40 percent to only 10, are still ill-understood. These differences really have little 
to do with the use of levels or first differences in the econometric analysis, or redistribution as 
opposed to stabilization. They stem from the accounting instead. However, the accounting 
raises some basic and neglected conceptual issues. The smoothing of regional shocks coming 
from this public source is around 12-15 percent overall. With respect to the market channels 
of risk-sharing, ASYs numbers for the U.S. are probably exaggerated. The pooling of risks in 
the EMU still lags behind the U.S. and will do so for a long time to come. But there already 
seems to be little to distinguish the euro zone from the U.S. in regard to the ability to borrow 
to smooth shocks. Thus, the extent of risk-sharing via credit  an issue that ASY do very well 
to raise  is of considerable importance. Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that the pro-
gress of European economic and monetary integration over the last decade has increased the 
symmetry of business cycles. But this poses a general conceptual problem. With the advance 
of capital market integration, people should be willing to accept more output risks since they 
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can share the risks more easily. From this perspective, the increase in the symmetry of busi-
ness cycles in the EMU could be a sign of remaining capital-markets imperfections. This is 
not the only reading, but it is a possible one. The interpretation would mean that the increas-
ing symmetry of business cycles in the Euro zone signals a poor allocation of the risks be-
tween individuals. 
 
I. Risk-sharing via the central government budget in the U.S.
General downturns in economic activity in a country tend to raise deficit spending by the cen-
tral government. Such responses by the government obviously say nothing about the smooth-
ing of regional shocks, or the smoothing of movements in the output of some regions relative 
to others. All relevant studies of regional stabilization through the federal budget in the U.S. 
necessarily try to control for this problem. They do so either by introducing a separate fixed 
effect for each period (von Hagen (1992), ASY (1996)) or else by using ratios of regional 
values to national averages (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), Bayoumi and Masson (1995)). 
Either procedure comes to about the same. The studies also proceed mostly by regressing a 
regional output variable or a regional income variable following net federal transfers on the 
same regional variable, prior to net transfers. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) (hereafter 
SiMS), who opened the discussion, measured both the aforementioned dependent and inde-
pendent variables in levels. These two authors also used personal income figures. They re-
ported 40 percent stabilization. An influential contribution by von Hagen (1992) then fol-
lowed quickly, and used first differences and real gross product figures. von Hagen got 10 per 
cent stabilization instead. He also ascribed the enormous difference in his results to his use of 
first differences rather than levels. Further, he suggested that his choice of first differences is 
the appropriate one in studying stabilization, whereas SiMSs choice of levels pertains more 
closely to redistribution instead. This diagnosis has made a lasting impression. To the con-
trary, however, the use of levels or first differences is not central. Moreover, there is little 
difference between redistribution (properly measured) and stabilization in the U.S.   
 
I will now briefly display the validity of these conclusions. Let Xit be either per capita per-
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sonal income in region i in year t divided by per capita personal income across the nation in 
year t, or else per capita gross product in region i in year t divided by per capita gross product 
in the nation. In either instance, the weighted sums of Xit values across the regions, based on 
population weights, equal one. Let Yit be the corresponding values of Xit after the addition of 
net transfers per capita by the national government. Consider next equations (1) and (2), con-
taining a disturbance term (µit or Ȟit, as the case may be).  
Yit = Įi + ȕsXit + µit          (1)
ǻYit = di + ȕsǻXit + Ȟit         (2) 
Equation (1) reflects SiMSs choice in analyzing stabilization in the U.S. Equation (2) reflects 
von Hagens. In both cases, ȕs relates to stabilization. If we take equation (1) in first differ-
ences, all the regional constants Įi drop out. Therefore, equation (2) does not follow exactly 
from equation (1), but rather supposes a possible regional drift or trend, di, in the Xit values 
over time. However, in the absence of such drifts or trends in the Xit terms (if di = 0), equation 
(2) is simply equation (1) in first differences (with ǻµit = Ȟit). Further, if, in addition, the dis-
turbances µit possess certain well-known statistical properties, then the estimates of equations 
(1) and (2) will yield identical estimates of ȕs. Suppose that a rise (fall) of $1 in Xit always 
yields a rise (fall) of Yit of 90 cents. Then ȕs is 0.9, and stabilization is 0.1. The measure of 
stabilization is therefore 1ȕs.  
 
Table 1 provides separate estimates of 1ȕs for equations (1) and (2), and reports these esti-
mates separately in case of SiMSs measure of Xit and von Hagens.  In all the estimates, the 
U.S. is broken up into 48 regions: the 50 states minus Alaska and Hawaï. The interpretation of 
transfers from the central government is always the same: namely, direct taxes plus social 
insurance plus transfers to persons and grants to states. As can be seen, in the event of the 
gross product measure (von Hagens), the estimates in levels and first differences are virtually 
identical. In case of the personal income one, the two estimates differ by 7 percent or less than 
half of the total (whether 0.2 or 0.27). But the differences between the two measures of Xit 
look important on the whole. We will come back to this last point shortly. 
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There is a third estimate in the table resting on a separate equation, owing to Bayoumi and 
Masson (1998): 
 (3) Y Xi d d i  D E Ki         (3) 
In this next example, Xi and Yi  represent averages of Xit and Yit over the whole study period. 
Consequently, unlike ȕs, the coefficient ȕd does not reflect any movement over time, but re-
lates strictly to cross-sectional differences between regions over the entire study period. Ac-
cordingly, the coefficient can be seen as pertaining to redistribution.1 The idea of separate 
coefficients ȕs and ȕd, for stabilization and redistribution, also makes perfect sense.  
 
It is easy to imagine countries where taxes would be moderate yet highly progressive, redis-
tributive spending would be high, and there would be no unemployment compensation, no 
temporary subsidies, no temporary tax breaks. Consequently, redistribution (ȕd) would be 
strong and stabilization (ȕs) weak. Alternatively, we can imagine the opposite: countries with 
strictly proportional taxation, lots of temporary aid in case of disasters but no permanent as-
sistance to the poor. Then ȕs would be high and ȕd low. It is clear from the table that the U.S. 
belongs to neither of these two instances. For this country, ȕs and ȕd are much the same. 
Therefore, not only is there little notable difference in levels and first differences for stabiliza-
tion in the U.S., but there is little indication of higher redistribution than stabilization.   
 
On the other hand, depending on personal income or gross product data, the stabilization and 
redistribution estimates in Table 1 do differ widely. They go from 12 to 14 percent to 20 to 27 
percent. The major contributors to the discussion of stabilization in the U.S. also divide right 
down the middle about the right measure to use. Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Obstfeld 
and Peri (1998) follow SiMS in adopting the personal income measure, while Goodhart and 
                                                 
1 As noted by Mélitz and Zumer (2002), equations (1) and (3) can be jointly derived from the 
more general hypothesis:  
 Y X X Xit d d i s it i it    D E E H( )  
(The sum of equations (1) and (3) gives rise to this last equation with Di equal Y   Xi s E i and 
Ki+Pit equal Hit.) As is also well known from panel data econometrics, estimates of this more 
general equation or separate estimates (within and between) of equations (1) and (3) yield 
identical estimates of ȕs and ȕd . 
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Smith (1993) and ASY (1996) opt for von Hagens gross product one. There is also an occa-
sional difference in the measure of net transfers. Those accounting choices are the critical 
ones. The combination of a narrow measure of net transfers and a wide measure of regional 
activity (gross product) leads to low estimates of stabilization, while the combination of a 
wide measure of net transfers and a narrow one of regional activity leads to high estimates of 
stabilization. Table 2 makes the point.  
 
The top half of the table relates to stabilization, the bottom one redistribution; the left-hand 
side relates to personal income, the right-hand one to gross product. In the case of either top 
or bottom half, lower rows (numbered 1, 2, 3) concern successively larger measures of net 
transfers. If we look down to lower rows, we find that the estimates of ȕs and ȕd successively 
rise. As regards the differences left and right, the figures for gross product are far higher than 
those for personal income. If we compare the columns on the left with the corresponding ones 
on the right, we find the estimates of ȕs and ȕd on the right consistently lower. SiMS com-
bined the highest measure of net transfers (rows 3) with the lower measure of Xit. von Hagen 
combined a lower measure of net transfers (rows 2) with the higher measure of Xit. That is the 
key to the difference in the estimate. 
 
It might seem that the critical choice is really that of Xit, and the measure of net transfers is 
subordinate as long as we limit the choice to rows 2 and 3. But that is an accident of the U.S. 
example. With regard to Canada, for instance, including or excluding federal grants to the 
provincial governments (choosing between rows 2 or 3) makes as much difference as choos-
ing personal income instead of gross product accounting. In the case of gross product ac-
counting (von Hagens choice), the estimate of ȕs is only 3 to 4 percent for Canada under the 
narrower measure of net transfers in rows 2, while adding the federal grants to the provincial 
governments raises the estimates of ȕs to 13 or 14 percent (depending on levels or first differ-
ences). Likewise, when we pass from the measure of net transfers in rows 2 to the wider one 
in rows 3, ȕd  goes from 16 to 30 percent in Canada (see Mélitz and Zumer (2002)). 
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What then is the right choice of accounting? We can think of regional income as the produc-
tion in the region. Then the income belongs partly to the residents of other regions. Or else we 
can think of regional income as the income of the residents. Then some of the income stems 
from production in other regions. It is difficult to see why one choice or the other should be 
the only right one. For example, consider a state like Louisiana where the population is poor 
but the output per head is high relative to the rest of the U.S., or another like Florida where 
much of the population is retired and living on income coming from elsewhere. To focus 
exclusively on gross product is to put the emphasis on the activity in the region: the 
productivity of firms, employment, infrastructure, etc. But that glosses over the issue of the 
welfare of the residents. Why not consider the stabilization and redistribution in the region 
from the standpoint of smoothing and equalizing these peoples revenues and their consump-
tion instead? Investigators take one view or the other, but there is much to be said for either 
view, and it may therefore be best to keep both of them in mind. The next question is whether 
regardless of the choice of measure of Xit, the same measure of net transfers should serve.  
 
If the issue is the redistribution and stabilization of the disposable gross product of the re-
gions, it seems clear that all the central-government net transfers are relevant. Regardless 
whether the transfers are direct or indirect, all of them support local activity. However, if the 
question relates to the redistribution and stabilization of the disposable personal income of the 
residents, then including the transfers to the regional governments is not necessarily correct. 
True, the residents of a region derive benefits from central-government subsidies to their local 
governments as well as such direct subsidies to themselves, since the ones to the regional 
governments provide them with better services of transportation, recreation, communication 
and so forth.  But so do tourists, transients and commuters. More important, if the net trans-
fers to the regional governments are to be included in the residents' disposable income, the 
question is why the entire flow of similar services that the residents get from local firms is not 
incorporated there as well (but only in so far as those services correspond to payments of 
wages and interest to residents). Much of the capital in a region belongs to the residents. 
Therefore, the retained earnings of local firms belong disproportionately to them too. Yet 
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those earnings do not enter into their personal income. If there are to be any imputations for 
transfers, should not those retained earnings be imputed to them too? Finally, it seems incon-
testable that if purchases from local firms by municipal and state governments are included in 
the residents' disposable income when the central government subsidizes them, those pur-
chases must always be included there.  
 
In other words, the issue is one of coherence in accounting: the concepts of income before and 
after net transfers must agree. The choice of a broad measure of net transfers requires a corre-
spondingly broad measure of income. As already shown, combining a broad measure of net 
transfers with a narrow measure of income will systematically swell the estimates of ȕs and 
ȕd. On these grounds, the proper measures of ȕs and ȕd would seem to be those in rows 2 in 
case of personal income accounting and in rows 3 in case of gross product accounting. If we 
also accept the usual preference for the estimates of stabilization in first differences, that puts 
the estimates for the U.S. in the range of 12 to 15 percent for ȕs and 14 to 18 percent for ȕd.2  
 
II. Interregional risk-sharing via credit and cross-ownership of property in the U.S. 
High estimates of interregional risk sharing via the federal government in the U.S. possibly 
dash any hope that risk-sharing in the EMU will ever attain the U.S. level. However, similarly 
high estimates of risk-sharing through market channels can even kindle such hope. Let us then 
examine the basis for ASYs estimate that the U.S. regions share over half of the insurable 
                                                 
2 Decressin (2002) raises an important separate issue. National governments make many pay-
ments to national civil servants, and public and private firms rather than households and 
lower-level governments. These payments do not always show up in the official regional ac-
counts  less so in centrally organized countries than federally organized ones. Furthermore, 
some of the spending in question may be on private goods, such as health and education, and 
those goods (or services) may be distributed based on a principle of equal access by everyone. 
Consequently, some redistribution may result from the relevant spending and possibly some 
stabilization too. But without a special decomposition of the relevant national spending by 
region, the analyst will miss the associated regional redistribution and stabilization. Decressin 
makes the right correction for Italy. He also thinks that the correction argues in favor of gross 
product accounting. The latter is difficult to see. Sicilians benefit greatly from education and 
health services that they receive privately from teachers and medical workers at national ex-
pense. Why should this lead us to favor analyzing the stabilization and redistribution of Sicil-
ian output per head rather than Sicilian personal income?  
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risks to output with one another via private channels.  
 
Consider a panel of regional data consisting of per capita output Yi, per capita personal in-
come PIi, per capita disposable income DIi, and per capita consumption Ci, all stated in real 















i        (4) 
Next, they take logarithms and first differences: 
' log Yi  ( ) + (' 'log logY Pi i I ' 'log logPI DIi i )  
      + (' 'log logDI Ci i ) + (' logC i )   (5) 
Then they multiply both sides of equation (5) by ' log Yi , and subsequently subtract the 
means of all five terms over the study period, the one on the left and the four in parentheses 
on the right. Following, they take expected values.  The result is the variance of the change in 
the log of Yi on the left and the sum of the covariances of this term with, respectively, 
'logYi 'logPIi, 'logPIi 'logDIi, 'logDIi  'logCi, and 'logCi, on the right. Finally, they 
divide both sides of the last equation by the variance of 'logYi. This yields: 
1   E E E EK G C U        (6) 
The covariance/variance E terms in equation (6) correspond exactly to OLS estimates 
of the following regressions: 
 ' ' 'log log logY PI Yi i K K i   iKD E P      
 ' ' 'log log logPI DI Yi i G G i   iGD E P    (7) 
 ' ' 'log log logDI C Yi i C C i   iCD E P  
' 'log logC Yi U U i iU D E P  
Consequently, ASY estimate all four equations. Before doing so, they introduce a fixed effect 
for each year in order to take account of the general growth rate in per capita output over all 
of the regions at each date. Then as a final and separate step, they assign a specific empirical 
interpretation to EK, EG, EC and EU. They interpret EK as a measure of the smoothing of re-
gional shocks to per capita regional output through the cross-regional ownership of claims to 
output; EG as a measure of the smoothing of these shocks through the central government 
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budget; EC as a measure of the similar smoothing coming from interregional credit; and EU as 
a measure of the unsmoothed portion of the regional shocks. The value of the whole exercise 
evidently depends on these last interpretations.  
 
Upon consideration, it is clearly possible to question the interpretations.  Take the equation 
for PIi/Ci, concerning household saving. Suppose there are changes in the age structure of 
households between regions. This is only reasonable since ASYs study covers 37 years 
(1963 to 1990). Those demographic changes may well induce changes in PIi/Ci independently 
of any movements in Yi. Subsequently (and as a separate point), those changes can also have 
some reverse effects on Yi. So far as this happens, the estimate of EC will evidently not con-
cern smoothing of output shocks at all. As regards Yi/PIi, suppose that firms sometimes make 
investment decisions based on anticipated changes in relative demand for their produce. Once 
again, Yi/PIi may change independently of changes in Yi and, additionally, there may be re-
verse effects on Yi. Then a similar problem as before arises: the estimate of EK will not reflect 
any smoothing by firms. Yet ASY do provide notable support for their interpretation.  
 
First, as regards EG, their procedure evidently nearly reproduces the one described before for 
estimating risk-sharing through the federal government budget based on gross product ac-
counting (and the use of first differences). Quite apart from this mere issue of precedent, the 
difference between personal income and disposable income is indeed likely to reflect essen-
tially the rules governing taxes and transfers.3 The problem of interpretation is far more se-
vere with respect to EC and EK.  As regards these two coefficients, underlying ASYs interpre-
tation is the idea that all risks associated with asymmetric shocks to output should be possible 
to pool since they are perfectly negatively correlated with one another. However, as ASY 
explicitly point out, so far as such risks are not pooled and remain uninsured, it should be eas-
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, there does remain a possibility of reverse causation or simultaneity bias in es-
timating EG based on equations (7) the way ASY do, just as there was before (unmentioned) 
in estimating Es based on equations (1) or (2) like earlier authors. As a result, both SiMS and 
Bayoumi-Masson used instrumental variables to correct for the problem. But Mélitz and 
Zumer (2002) found that the correction makes hardly any difference.  
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ier to obtain credit for smoothing those of the associated shocks to output that are temporary. 
Hence, less persistent shocks should lead to higher estimates of smoothing via credit. Based 
on this logic, ASY use the Campbell-Mankiw (1987) index to distinguish the persistence of 
shocks affecting different states. They also employ averages over successively longer periods 
to do the same. In addition, they classify the U.S. states according to the degree of the sensi-
tivity of their industrial structure to cyclical movement and therefore their proneness to short 
swings. These tests generally confirm ASYs hypothesis that more persistent shocks increase 
EK relative to EC. This would then seem to indicate that higher values of the ratio EK/EC sig-
nify greater reliance on insurance relative to credit in smoothing regional output shocks.  On 
this ground, ASYs estimates of risk-sharing through market channels in the U.S. deserve 
serious attention.  
 
Nonetheless, there are two reasons why those estimates are too high. First, ASY understate 
EU. Second, they neglect the fact that EK and EC partly reflect autonomous smoothing within 
the regions themselves having nothing to do with risk-sharing.  
 
On the first point, the importance of EU in assessing EK + EC should be clear. Based on the 
identity (6), EK + EG + EC + EU equals one, and therefore every percentage point of EU means 
a percent less risk sharing.  In order to estimate EU, as mentioned, ASY simply regress the 
fourth equation in the set (7). However, to do so is to treat the extent to which regional con-
sumption responds to output shocks as a structural parameter. In effect, it supposes that there 
is a structural tendency to smooth shocks from which deviations yield a random term averag-
ing zero. But this is a strong assumption (compare Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001)). 
Most of the discussion of unsmoothed output shocks in the literature simply draws inferences 
directly from the correlations between the series for consumption and output or else from the 
ratios of the variances or standard deviations between the two series. Proceeding in this man-
ner, the lowest figure that Mélitz and Zumer (1999) obtain for EU in ASYs data series is 
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0.39.4 This then implies a maximum of 0.61 interregional smoothing. Del Negro (2002) de-
votes an entire study to the calculation of interregional smoothing of output shocks by indi-
vidual states based on factor analysis, in which he tries to identify taste shocks separately. 
Consequently, when he uses ASYs data set, his figure for EU is .68 (see his Table 3). In sum, 
only by treating EU as a structural parameter rather than as a mere statistical feature of the 
data is it possible to come up with a figure for EU as low as ASYs.5  
 
The other reason why ASY overestimate risk-sharing through the market is their assumption 
that EK + EC solely reflects risk-sharing between states. But a state can obviously smooth an 
idiosyncratic shock by saving or dissaving, without any commerce with other states or inde-
pendently of any crisscrossing of outstanding property claims. Indeed, in the international 
application of ASYs framework, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) make a good deal of this very 
point. There they introduce a new term ES, relating to smoothing via domestic saving. Yet 
they never return to the issue how much of EK + EC in their U.S. study with Asdrubali truly 
represents risk-sharing as opposed to smoothing via within-state (or domestic) business and 
household saving.  
 
It is interesting to go further and to ask whether there is possibly also some confusion of in-
surance and smoothing of uninsured shocks through credit in ASYs estimates of EK and EC. 
Take the extreme case of perfect risk sharing: that is, suppose the pooling of all risks associ-
ated with asymmetric (regional) shocks to output. ASY would then assume EK equal 1EU, 
and EC and EG equal zero.  But is this what theory says? Not necessarily. According to the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, the use of dividends policy by firms to smooth shocks is entirely 
irrelevant. In the present context, such policy by firms could be super-irrelevant. Not simply 
                                                 
4 The figure obtains by taking the ratio of the variance of regional consumption (not the log) 
to the variance of regional product (not the log) for each year and then averaging over the 
years during the study period. Despite Mélitz and Zumers (1999) emphatic departure from 
ASY on this score, Del Negro (2002) manages somehow to treat them not only as supporting 
ASYs procedure, but even as confirming their figure of 0.25 for EU (p. 274). 
5 This low figure could well result from the fact that a regression yields a positive constant 
term, which then reduces the slope of the regression line in a univariate regression. 
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might shareholders not respond to dividends policy because the policy has no impact on their 
present wealth, but because the policy does not even affect their present income. The divi-
dends, as such, could be sufficiently diversified for this outcome. Let us assume, in line with 
much evidence, that the business sector does systematically stabilize dividends (uselessly 
according to the ordinary theorem, super-uselessly in the event of perfect risk sharing). And 
suppose also that dividends are not sufficiently diversified to prevent an impact of the divi-
dends policy on regional personal income. Under this pair of circumstances, there must be 
some inverse correlation between business and household saving, since household consump-
tion stays the same independently of the dividends policy.  
 
In fact, many region-specific risks are not insured. The risks pertaining to labor income can-
not be so since the proper contracts cannot even be written. To that extent, the irrelevance 
theorem itself is irrelevant. In addition, even as concerns capital income rather than labor in-
come, we know that the diversification of asset portfolios is imperfect within regions (see 
Hess and van Wincoop, eds. (1999)). Still, so far as the irrelevance theorem holds and there is 
any impact of dividends policy on regional personal income, there must be some inverse cor-
relation of risk smoothing between firms and households. ASYs estimate of EK must be too 
high. 
 
Mélitz and Zumer (1999) offer some relevant evidence. Table 3 shows ASYs aforementioned 
estimates of EK, EG, EC and EU in the first column. These estimates rest on pooling of equa-
tions (7) and generalized least squares. The next three columns provide revised estimates by 
Mélitz and Zumer (MZ) based on the identical data. There are four notable differences. First, 
instead of time fixed-effects, MZ use ratios of regional values to national values to correct for 
movements in the aggregates. Second, they add regional fixed effects (to allow for possible 
drift or trend in regional ratios). Thus, the equations are not the same. Nevertheless, these first 
two departures yield no difference of note in estimates for the U.S. Third, MZ suppose EU 
equal to 0.39, as mentioned before. Consequently, they estimate only the first three of the 
equations (7) as a system, and impose the cross-equation restriction EK + EG + EC = 10.39. 
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Last, and most relevant at present, they add a few variables to reflect influences that condition 
the effects of the regional output shocks. (Conformably, they impose a separate cross-
equation restriction requiring the trio of coefficients associated with each of the influences to 
sum to zero, so that the restriction EK + EG + EC = 10.39 still remains the right one.) The table 
reports the results concerning two of the extra influences:  the Campbell-Mankiw index of 
persistence of the asymmetric shocks (P); and the degree of asymmetry of the individual-state 
business cycle (Z) (as inferred with the use of a Hodrick-Prescott filter).6  The results relating 
to Z, or the smoothing of short run shocks, imply some offsetting behavior by households in 
response to dividends policy. Therefore, these results confirm the possibility that ASY over-
estimate EK and the smoothing by firms.  But this requires some explanation. 
 
The last column in Table 3 (concerning Z) shows that in the event that shocks reflected 
strictly the (state-specific) business cycle, household saving would explain 7 percent more of 
the smoothing (7 percent less would be done by firms). This in itself could simply issue from 
the fact that the only uninsured shocks that households are able to smooth through credit are 
transitory ones (ASYs interpretation). But as is not directly inferable from the table, omitting 
the variable Z from the analysis also raises EK relative to EC by the full 7 percent. In other 
words, the failure to isolate short run influences in any way leads to a greater attribution of 
smoothing to firms relative to households. That suggests more: namely, the earlier interpreta-
                                                 
6 The estimated system is: 
iKii,jj,KiKKii ylog)X(logylogpilogylog P'J'ED ''   
iGii,jj,GiGGii ylog)X(logylogdilogpilog P'J'ED ''  (5) 
 iCii,jj,CiCCii ylog)X(logylogclogdilog P'J'ED ''  
  subject to E E E E EK G C U U     1 0, 1  
  and  for all j, , j n 1,... , J J JK j G j C j, , ,   0  
where the Xj variables are new influences in the econometric analysis. The use of lower-case 
letters instead of the upper-case ones in equations (7) serves to indicate that the variables are 
no longer per capita values, as before, but ratios of per capita values to per capita national 
averages (adding up to one with appropriate weights). Table 3 only reports the results for P 
and Z, but there are two other Xj variables in the study.  
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tion: that households offset some unnecessary smoothing of shocks by firms via dividends 
policy.7  
 
As seen by comparing columns 1 and 2, the sum outcome of MZs revisions is to lower EK 
and to keep EG and EC unchanged. Because of these changes, the regional smoothing of 
shocks via adjustments in the income households receive from firms no longer seems larger 
than the regional smoothing of shocks via household saving.  
 
In short, two basic conclusions emerge: first, ASY exaggerate the extent of risk sharing; sec-
ond, they ascribe too much of the smoothing of output shocks to portfolio diversification and 
to firms and too little to household saving. In the international application, further doubts will 
set in about the proper measure of risk-sharing via credit as such.  
 
III. Risk-sharing via credit and cross-ownership of property in the EMU 
In the case of international evidence, ASYs method becomes easier to apply. The data are 
superior. ASY even needed to infer consumption by individual state in the U.S. from retail 
sales. On the international front, the national accounts provide the required series for con-
sumption. Moreover, the current account statistics offer figures for net foreign lending or the 
accumulation of claims on foreigners. In addition, the difference between gross national 
product and gross domestic product yields net income on foreign property claims. Accord-















i         (8) 
where Yi is gross domestic product (as before), GNPi is gross national product, Ai is home 
                                                 
7 With respect to P, column 3 shows, in conformity with earlier discussion, that if all the 
shocks were persistent, the smoothing via business saving would be about 35 percent greater. 
However, very significantly, removing P, and thus treating all shocks indifferently without 
regard to degree of persistence, does not affect the respective estimates of EK and EC. There is 
therefore no evidence that households offset the smoothing of persistent shocks by firms. In 
terms of Modigliani-Miller, this means that the smoothing of persistent shocks via business 
saving may reflect optimal policy and may be in the shareholders best interests. If so, the 
households would have no cause to offset the smoothing of the permanent shocks by firms.  
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absorption, Yi  Ai is therefore the export surplus on current account, and finally, Ci is the 
sum of private and public consumption. Proceeding as ASY did before, we then have: 
iKi1KKii YlogGNPlogYlog P'ED ''      
 iCi1CCii YlogAlogGNPlog P'ED ''      (9) 
 iSiSSii YlogClogAlog P'ED ''  
' 'log logC Yi U U i iU D E P  
In this case, EK1 concerns much more precisely what ASY intended before by EK, and the 
same may be said for EC1 with regard to EC. But, of course, a separate term must enter, ES, 
relating to smoothing of output shocks via strict domestic saving, some of it by firms, some of 
it by households. There is one basic qualification to this general idea of the superiority of 
equations (9) to equations (7) in analyzing risk-sharing. The differences between GDP and 
GNP may cover income flows, but they do leave out capital gains and losses on international 
claims. Therefore, any smoothing of output shocks that would be associated with such gains 
and losses would not enter in EK1, where in principle it belongs. It would affect ES instead. In 
addition, equations (9), as they are now stated, ignore any term for EG, thus any role for stabi-
lization by a super-government. True, the EU Commission has a budget, but it is small in rela-
tion to GDP, and the EU structural funds program relates essentially to redistribution rather 
than stabilization.  
 
Table 4 provides estimates of equations (9). In this case, the sources are Sørensen and Yosha 
(1998) (hereafter SY) and MZ. In both instances, the table reports the results relating most 
closely to the current EMU members: namely, the EU8 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) in the case of SY and the EU15 in the case 
of MZ. In both cases, the reported results also cover the period that compares best with the 
one in ASY (1964 to 1990). Like ASY, SY estimate EU by running the last of the regressions 
in equations (9) while MZ impose EU based on the same ratio of variances as was noted be-
fore in discussing their work (footnote 4). SY also deal with EC1 strictly in the context of a 
separate decomposition of ES + EC1. For SY, 22 to 43 percent of the asymmetric output shocks 
are smoothed; for MZ only 23 percent. For SY, the smoothing is entirely domestic, and there 
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is no risk-sharing. For MZ, there is some risk-sharing, 8 percent, coming from the cross-
ownership of claims to property, but most of the smoothing is domestic.  In both studies, cur-
rent account balances explain nothing: there is no international smoothing of asymmetric 
shocks via credit.   
 
These results about risk-sharing may seem reasonable on the surface. We would not expect 
much crosscountry insurance against asymmetric shocks in light of the importance of home 
preference in portfolios of equities. Ratios of foreign direct investment to total home invest-
ment are also generally small. Even MZs estimate of 8 percent for insurance via international 
portfolio diversification may look high. In addition, the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle speaks pre-
cisely about the small contribution of foreign saving to the financing of domestic investment. 
Correlations between domestic saving and domestic investment (both as percentages of GDP) 
over periods of five to seven years or over are much higher than we would expect under per-
fect risk sharing. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found those correlations to be close to one in 
the OECD in their initial study, covering the 60s to mid-70s. The correlations have dropped 
since. But as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) stress, the correlations are still 60 percent in the 
OECD over 1990-97; and nothing resembling similarly high numbers exists in corresponding 
studies of regions within countries (Helliwell (1998)). Thus, it seems reasonable too that EC1 
would be negligible in table 4.  
 
However, there are other sources of evidence about risk-sharing in the EMU. The system now 
exists since 1999. What are the other indications thus far?  
 
I cannot pretend to do justice to the question. That would require a separate study. One vol-
ume of the recent report of the British Treasury (2003) about entry into EMU, titled EMU and 
the cost of capital, provides a summary of the evidence. Some increase in the diversification 
of equity portfolios has occurred in the membership since the run-up to EMU. Cross-country 
correlations between returns on equities have risen. The total variance of equity returns in the 
EMU now seems to depend less on country-specific factors and more on common industry 
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factors. There have also been a number of cross-country mergers and acquisitions, though 
fewer than expected. To all evidence, though, as regards the diversification of property 
claims, the EMU still has a long way to go before approaching the degree of capital market 
integration in the U.S.  
 
On the other hand, with respect to the availability of credit from the rest of the membership, 
the closing of the gap between the euro zone and the US has gone very far. The bond market 
in euros took off as soon as it appeared. Gross international issues of bonds and notes in euros 
just about tripled between the end of 1997 and the end of 1999 (H.M. Treasury (2002), chart 
4.1), as compared with issues in predecessor currencies. Before the appearance of the euro, 
bond issues by firms and public agencies in the euro zone had been predominantly triple A 
and double A (80 percent of them as late as 1998). Since then, single A and triple B issues 
have become a high percentage of the total: over 40% in 2001 (ibid. table 4.1). Evidently, 
numerous borrowers in the euro zone who had previously relied exclusively on banks now 
issue bonds in euros. Holdings of bonds of the major governments in the euro zone are also 
now widely held in the membership and internationally. Most significant of all perhaps, little 
remains of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) report a value of 
0.14 for the relevant coefficient in the regression for domestic investment for the euro area 
over 1991-2001, down from 0.41 in 1975-1990. In addition, the current account deficits of the 
two present members of EMU who are still in a catch-up phase, Portugal and Greece, rose to 
10 and 6-7 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2000-2001.  
 
How much more smoothing of asymmetric shocks has already come from this rapprochement 
with the U.S. in the euro zone and how much is still to follow? The very nature of the ques-
tion is important: it poses the matter differently than we encountered it before. The issue is 
not how much of the risk-sharing already results or will result in the future from credit, but by 
how much credit already reduces or will reduce the fraction of the shocks that remain 
unsmoothed. We might think that we should get roughly the same answer either way. If a 
mechanism accounts for a particular percentage of the smoothing, its absence should reduce 
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the smoothing as much.  As regards risk sharing through property claims, Athanasoulis and 
van Wincoop (2001)s results go in this direction.  These authors, in fact, approach the issue 
of insurance (or risk-sharing via asset diversification) precisely from the angle of a reduction 
in EU. Despite some difference in their measure of EU (in the same spirit as the one in MZ) 
and despite their strict focus on the long-term horizon (to eliminate transitory shocks), they 
get analogous figures for EK in the U.S. (and for EG too for that matter) to those in ASY.8 But 
as regards risk-sharing through credit, some reflection will show that a focus on the negative 
impact on EU is almost bound to make a difference: the very sign of EC1 is ambiguous.  
 
In reasoning about EC, in fact, ASY reason strictly about EC1, since their analysis relates 
strictly to borrowing and lending. They conclude that the sign must be positive because a 
permanent asymmetric shock to output should have no effect on lending or borrowing, 
whereas a transitory one should raise lending if the shock is positive and borrowing if the 
shock is negative. Thus, in case of a mix of permanent and transitory shocks, positive values 
follow for EC1. However, the examples of Portugal and Greece reveal the precariousness of 
this reasoning. Suppose that a positive permanent shock implies a rising profile of output in 
the future (catch-up). Then the country ought to borrow and EC1 can be expected to be nega-
tive. There is also a major difficulty in regard to transitory shocks. Assume a recession. The 
affected country should save less, or in terms of SY, the sign of ES should be positive. How-
ever, imports will fall with the drop in income, and may do so more than exports (which 
might have dropped under the initial impact of the shock). Indeed, if the shock lowers the 
terms of trade enough and shifts demand sufficiently in favor of home goods, then a fall in 
imports minus exports is to be expected.  Once again, the sign of EC1 will be negative. This 
last example actually fits well with usual macroeconomic modeling  better than ASYs logic 
                                                 
8 Their estimates vary from 0.35, almost exactly ASYs figure, to 0.215, close to MZs, de-
pending on the presence (0.35) or absence (0.215) of interest and dividends in personal in-
come. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) also consider those figures to pertain strictly to 
regional insurance, or EK1 rather than EK.  In so doing, though, they disregard the fact that 
many firms are owned entirely by state residents and operate strictly within state borders. 
These firms saving behavior would affect their estimate but have nothing to do with insur-
ance and the sharing of risks between states. 
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in favor of a positive sign for EC1. Our models often say that recession yields a short run im-
provement in the current account balance in light of the size of the fall in imports. Thus, re-
gardless whether shocks are permanent or transitory, the sign of EC1 is ambiguous.9  
 
In sum, it is already a live issue today to know how much extra risk-sharing there is and how 
much is still to arrive in the euro area because of greater ease of borrowing and lending. But 
unfortunately, ASY, SY and MZ offer little guidance. Their method of investigation will not 
allow us to answer the question.  
 
IV. The impact of EMU on total insurable risks
Discussion of EMU often focuses on the degree to which shocks are symmetric. In the present 
context, this concerns the extent to which the risks are insurable by the market. So far as risks 
are common and cannot be insured, of course, they can be managed through joint monetary 
policy. This is the usual emphasis. But it is important to consider the issue of the extent of 
common risks from the perspective of the potential for risk-sharing through market channels 
as well. 
 
A frequent starting point is Krugmans (1991, 1993) prediction that EMU would lead to more 
region-specific shocks and thereby less scope for smoothing shocks through monetary policy. 
According to his assessment, the U.S. regions are more specialized than the EMU countries of 
comparable size, probably because of the closer approximation to a single market in the U.S. 
Hence, as impediments to trade diminish and capital markets become more integrated in the 
EMU, the members can expect to move toward greater industrial specialization. These coun-
tries will then experience increasing asymmetry of shocks.  
                                                 
9 In both of the previous examples of a negative sign of EC1, credit is also likely to smooth 
consumption and therefore to reduce EU. This is capital. In the example of a permanent shock 
yielding a rising profile of output over time, the borrowing permits a smaller upward tilt in 
consumption. In that of the adverse transitory shock, the lending abroad moderates the drop in 
output, and thereby may cushion the fall in current consumption. Repairing the problem in 
ASYs analysis in the latter case, pertaining to the transitory shock, would clearly mean re-
moving their identification of the exogenous shock with the observed change in output. 
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 Subsequent empirical investigation does not particularly agree with Krugmans analysis. He 
had compared U.S. data for 1977 with European data for 1985. But Kim (1995) shows that 
the trend in the U.S. has been going the other way for years beforehand: regional specializa-
tion  fell substantially and continuously between the 1930s and 1987 (p.882).10 According 
to Peri (1998), by 1986, regional specialization was already no higher in the U.S. than in the 
EU. Furthermore, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) report lower or equal specialization in the 
eight census regions of the U.S. than in the EU14 over 1981-1997.  
 
Recent empirical work on the symmetry of business cycles sheds further doubt on Krugmans 
views. To go back a bit, test results indicate that monetary union promotes bilateral trade 
(Rose (2000)). Conformably, Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003)) show that EMU has already 
brought a certain increase in bilateral trade since 1998.  In addition, Frankel and Rose (1998) 
display a tendency for business cycle correlations to rise with the intensity of bilateral trade in 
the OECD. Still more recent research by Engel and Rose (2003) and Clark and van Wincoop 
(2001) corroborates Frankel and Roses results, in the case of the former based on a world-
wide sample of countries, in the case of the latter, based on a narrower sample of countries 
and regions in the OECD. Taken together with the Rose evidence, the inference would be that 
EMU will tend to promote the symmetry of business cycles.  
 
Studies by Firdmuc (2004) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001) are relevant too. 
Firdmuc (2004) offers econometric evidence that intra-industrial trade raises symmetry of 
business cycles, while inter-industrial trade does the opposite. This would imply that the pre-
vious evidence of the rise in the symmetry of business cycles with increasing trade reflects the 
influence of intra-industry trade. For their part, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001) 
provide indications that industrial specialization reduces the symmetry of business cycles. 
This is true both for regions within countries and between countries. These three authors re-
                                                 
10 Evidently aware of this evolution, Krugman (1993) put the evidence in doubt. See his note 
4. 
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sult would seem to support Krugmans general intuition. But if we link the result to the evi-
dence that greater bilateral trade increases the correlation of business cycles, the implication 
would be that with greater trade, regions and countries become less specialized.11
 
There is no difficulty explaining why EMU would promote intra-industry trade, reduce na-
tional specialization, and increase the symmetry of business cycles. As income rises, the new 
trade may well predominantly concern goods that are highly income-elastic and price-elastic 
in demand. This means more trade in differentiated products and increasing intra-industry 
trade. If the same industries take foot everywhere, countries become less specialized.12 The 
rise in the symmetry of business cycles with advancing intra-industry trade can follow in 
many ways. As intra-industry trade goes forward, industry shocks will become increasingly 
common shocks. With greater market integration, all shocks may also spread more quickly, as 
Frankel and Rose (1998) stress, and this can raise the covariance of aggregate business activ-
ity.  
 
Notwithstanding, the previous evidence does raise a certain difficulty of interpretation. Ac-
cording to standard microeconomic analysis, individuals should be willing to bear more pro-
duction risks as capital market integration deepens. They can insure themselves better; and 
they can borrow more easily. Hence, production risks should be less of a concern to them. 
Based on a large literature, insurance opportunities encourage people to accept riskier, higher 
return projects. (See, among many others, Obstfeld (1994) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and 
Yosha (1999, 2001).) How then do we reconcile this theoretical argument with a tendency of 
EMU to lead toward higher symmetry of business cycles? Does such a tendency fly in the 
face of theory? 
 
There are two avenues of reconciliation. One is to ascribe the recent increase in symmetry of 
                                                 
11 Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yoshas own emphasis differs distinctly. 
12 But the diminished national specialization need not signify diminished regional specializa-
tion, since with a reduction in some border costs  say, multiple money ones  but not others, 
firms may move their production closer to their neighbors without traversing frontiers. 
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business cycles to low capital market integration, low international insurance, and limited 
international credit. On this view, as capital market integration advances and people pool their 
risks more efficiently and obtain larger, more secure lines of credit, they will undertake riskier 
output projects. Then the asymmetry of shocks in the euro zone will increase. Of course, this 
will also expose uninsured workers in the euro zone to an increasing share of the risks. It will 
therefore raise the urgency of increasing the flexibility of the labor market. The lack of any 
system of transfer payments through upper-level government in the EMU will also possibly 
become an increasing handicap. This line of reasoning evidently tends to take us back to 
Krugmans views and may underlie the appeal of his stand.  
 
The other avenue of reconciliation is to argue that the euro has indeed already led to an in-
crease in production risks. But the new risks are common, and therefore consistent with 
greater symmetry of business cycles. On this next view, there has been notable progress in 
capital market integration in the euro zone. But the move to a more efficient allocation of 
risks has not meant moving to greater specialization of output activities within national fron-
tiers. Presumably, in this case, the new technologies simply do not require notable increase in 
individual plant size. Since the added risks are common, they are manageable through joint 
macroeconomic policy. Of course, if so, the burden of responsibility on the European Central 
Bank also rises. Consequently, greater flexibility of labor markets still helps, and may help a 
lot, in attenuating shocks. But macroeconomic policy at the EU level has a larger role to play 
in smoothing economic activity.  
 
Evidently, the second view is far more optimistic. If the first view is right, then the euro zone 
has not advanced much toward an efficient allocation of risks. Instead, the zone has largely 
sought shelter against the winds of competition through increasing diversification at home. 
Not only does this limit welfare, but market forces will tend to work in the future toward a 
change in direction: that is, a move toward greater specialization on a national basis.  The 
zone will then eventually need to face the associated problem of inability to extend market 
insurance to labor. 
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TABLE 1 
STABILIZATION AND REDISTRIBUTION VIA FEDERAL TRANSFERS IN THE 
U.S. 1977-1992: 48 REGIONS 
                                  STABILIZATION 
                                           Level: eq. (1)         First difference: eq. (2) 
REDISTRIBUTION 
Eq. (3)  
                                                1Es                  R 2        1Es                   R 2      1Ed               R 2     
PERSONAL 
INCOME 
        0.272         0.922  
(0.008)       
0.20           0.846    
(0.012) 
    0.213           0.974    
   (0.019) 
  GROSS 
PRODUCT 
        0.13           0.985  
(0.004)       
0.118 0.968    
(0.006) 
    0.136           0.976    
   (0.02)  
The standard errors in parentheses pertain to Ed or to Es.  Regional constants are omitted. Net 
transfers consist of direct taxes and social insurance, transfers to persons and federal grants to 
state and municipal governments. See Mélitz and Zumer (2002).  
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 TABLE 2 
STABILIZATION AND REDISTRIBUTION VIA FEDERAL TRANSFERS IN THE 
U.S. 1977-1992: 48 REGIONS 
                            STABILIZATION: PERSONAL
                             INCOME           
                                    Level            First difference 
                                    Eq.(1)                  Eq. (2) 
STABILIZATION: GROSS 
PRODUCT     
            Level           First difference 
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The standard errors in parentheses pertain to Ed or to Es.  See Mélitz and Zumer (2002).   
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATES OF THE ASY (ASDRUBALI-SØRENSEN-YOSHA) AND THE 
REVISED ASY MODEL 
USA 1964-1990 
(1)                      
ASY 
           (2)                       (3)                      (4) 
MZ 
     Eq. 1   E
K  
= 0.39
                
 
                         (13) 
    E
K
 = 0.24        J
K
(P) = 0.346      J
K
(Z) =  0.067     R
2
= 0.47 
            (7.6)                    (10.2)                  ( 5.06) 
     Eq. 2   E
G  
= 0.13 
                         (13) 
    E
G
 = 0.13        J
G
(P) = 0.031       J
G
(Z) = 0.006     R
2
= 0.20 
            (7.8)                   (1.82)                    ( 0.9) 
     Eq. 3   E
C  
= 0.23 
                            (4) 
    E
C
 = 0.24        J
C
(P) =  0.377    J
C
(Z) = 0.073       R
2
= 0.11 
            (6.8)                   ( 10.04)              (4.97) 
     Eq. 4   E   = 0.25 
U
                           (4)  
EU = 0.39 
Sources: Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996); Mélitz and Zumer (1999). Student ts are in 









ESTIMATES OF THE ASY MODEL BASED ON INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE  
 
                      (1)                             (2)                                 (3)                               (4)   
 SY:EC8 1966-1980     SY:EC8 1981-1990     SY:EC8 1966-1990    MZ:EU15 1960-1994   
     E
K1  
         ~0
                
                 0.02                                                                  0.08                 
                   (~0)                          (0.67)                                                                 (4.77) 
                                                                                                                           R
2
= 0.01 
    E +E    0.42                           0.16 
S C1 
                  (2-8)                          (3-4) 
      E
C1 
                                                                             0.04                              0.02               
                      (0.8)                            (0.71) 
                                                       R
2
= 0.03 
     E
S
                                                                                 0.42                               0.13      
                     (8.4)                              (6.22) 
                                                         R
2
= 0.02 
      E
U
        0.57                         0.78                                                                       0.77 
                 (9.5)                        (11.1)                   
Notes: The sources are Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Mélitz and Zumer (1999). The EC8 in 
columns 1 and 2 refer to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the UK. The first two columns come from Sørensen and Yoshas Table 1. E
K1











 combined. Column 3 comes from their Table 6. Column 
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